The Slippery Slope U.S. Military Moves Into Mexico By S. Brian Willson March 1997 Section II: Unmasking the Drug War INDIGENOUS INSURGENTS NOT INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING The Mexican government and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have each declared that the Indigenous groups involved in the uprisings, though often labeled by some as "terrorists," or "guerrilla insurgents," are not suspected of participation in the narcotics trade.1 Thus when observers note the number of military troops and amount of military equipment, much of it from the United States, in and around Indigenous communities in Chiapas and other southern states, it cannot be rationalized as needed for combating the narcotic trafficking. Generally the Clinton administration insists that U.S. aid funds anti-drug, not counterinsurgency efforts. As noted in Section I, it is "unrealistic" to believe that anti-drug operations will be kept separate from counterinsurgency tactics. In the fall of 1996, U.S. President Clinton sent an additional $112 million in military equipment (including helicopters, surveillance aircraft, patrol boats, troop gear, ammunition, training and technical assistance) to Colombian, Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Mexican militaries.2 Thus under the guise of the drug war, the Clinton administration is beefing up repressive security forces responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including Mexico. In a short period of time, U.S. military aid is being tripled to fight the drug war in Latin America.3 In Clinton’s latest anti-drug budget of $15.l billion, he proposes creation of an anti-narcotics base in Panama to augment the U.S. military’s role throughout the region. In fiscal year (FY) 1997, Clinton requested $213 million for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Account, primarily to arm and train military and police forces in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico.4 In the past year the U.S. and Mexican governments have created a high-level task force and a series of working groups to plan "coordinated and urgent" action to curtail drug trafficking.5 However, recent revelations about the extent of Mexico’s corrupt anti-narcotics effort makes a mockery of any working group between the two countries. The recent arrest and detention of Mexico’s drug czar, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo (director of National Institute To Combat Drugs/INCD), exposes how deeply the leaders of Mexico’s drug cartels have penetrated the highest ranks of Mexico’s anti-narcotics and political institutions. The trade is facilitated by participation of wealthy families, mostly in central (Morelos, Jalisco) and northern states (Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas) and the border cities of Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.6 Historically Mexico’s drug trade has been centered in the tri-state area of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua.7 These states are far north from the areas of active Indigenous insurgencies. Mexico’s INCD issued a report covering the period, Nov. 16, 1995-April 30, 1996, in which the Institute identified the 10 Mexican states in which the most drugs had been found and destroyed. The southern state of conflict-ridden Chiapas was not mentioned. In April 1996 the International Drug Enforcement Conference was held in Mexico City. Officials from throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as from the United States were present. The head of Colombia’s Narcotic Security Administration identified Mexican drug mafiosos who provide South American cartels major assistance in trafficking drugs to the U.S. through use of secret runways and coastal ports. He identified the locations of these runways and ports in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and the state of Tamaulipas, all in northern Mexico near the border. Nonetheless, at the same conference, Harold Wankel, then operations chief of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), revealed the presence of U.S. anti-drug teams in Chiapas, 2,000 miles south of the U.S.-Mexican border, the area where the Indigenous communities are active in insurgencies but are not suspected of involvement in the drug trade.8 There are at least 46 DEA agents operating in Mexico,9 the largest foreign operation of the DEA. The presence of DEA teams within Mexico is consistent with U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey’s 1996 declaration of the need to increase the U.S. anti-narcotic effort within Mexican territory.10 However McCaffrey also admitted that the anti-narcotics programs in the Andes region have made little difference in interrupting the flow of drugs.11 Central and northern regions of Mexico might be appropriate for anti-drug efforts. However, Chiapas is not! Four main drug mafiosos have been identified in Mexico, all with major operations in northern regions connected to the 2,000 mile common Mexican-U.S. border.12 The narcotics economy has become part of everyday life in northern, not southern Mexico. The underground economy built on decades of smuggling contraband, people and drugs to the United States, has become so intertwined with the region’s legitimate wealth that the two are nearly indistinguishable. The extent and depth of corruption can be understood since drugs funnel as much as $30 billion/year into the Mexican economy, more than the country’s top two legitimate exports (including oil) combined. Drug-based corruption is so institutionalized that normal government channels are simply not able to clean it up. There is too much money at stake. An average policeman in Mexico might be paid the equivalent of $335 per month by the government. A drug operative can pay the equivalent of $1,000 dollars a week, or $4,000/month, for protection.13 FIGHTING DRUGS MUCH LESS IMPORTANT THAN PRESERVING MEXICO’S ECONOMY President Clinton’s recent recertification of Mexico as a cooperative ally in fighting drugs despite the extensive corruption of the anti-narcotics efforts reveals a deeper truth about the genuine interest the U.S. has with Mexico. Preserving "stability" and confidence in the Mexican economic system is far more important than combating the drug trade. Reports of corruption in Mexico’s anti-drug efforts over the years have received little attention prior to the recent shocking arrest of Mexico’s drug czar. U.S. officials involved on the war on drugs admit that the Mexican drug traffickers’ political patrons are seldom targets of law enforcement officials in either country even though they play an important role in drug trafficking.14 Since the DEA in Mexico feel they get little support if they scrutinize the activities of Mexican political officials, there is reluctance to invest time and money in pursuing corrupt Mexican officials.15 There is a definite conclusion that the Clinton administration considers the war against drugs less important than fostering commerce.16 There is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom the DEA has a trusting relationship.17 Anonymous U.S. officials admit that the United States has consistently given trade and other economic and political interests more weight than forcing Mexico to stop the flow of drugs.18 A retired high ranking DEA official declared that that drugs have never been the number one issue as it relates to Mexico."19 Robert Nieves, former DEA chief of international operations, acknowledged recently that the drug issue "ranks somewhere below the North American Free Trade Agreement, economic bailout and other bilateral trade and commerce issues."20 If Clinton had chosen to withhold certification from Mexico it might have effected economic relations. The true purpose of U.S. aid to Mexico was exposed in the Chase Bank memo discussed in Section I above: "The Zapatistas must be eliminated." NAFTA, free trade and unfettered corporate capitalism are the genuinely important political values. The Clinton presidency has promoted this imperative. Any event or activity perceived as a threat to the ruling elite and their profitable enterprises is by extension a threat to U.S. economic interests. Insurgency in Mexico is the most urgent challenge. Therefore counterinsurgency is the most important response from the perspective of the elite and their governments. Thus the reason that the Mexican military is so abundantly present with their U.S.-supplied armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and other military equipment in the Indigenous communities is to contain and destroy Indigenous organizations (counterinsurgency) who are seeking genuine democracy and justice. The military presence is clearly not intended to destroy drug trafficking because that is not even suspected among the Indigenous insurgents. However, the Mexican army with the aid of materials and equipment from the United States is preserving centuries old patterns of poverty and repression. CORRUPTION WITHIN THE MEXICAN MILITARY IN THE DRUG WAR The recent revelations of corruption in the Mexican drug fighting bureaucracy only exacerbate mounting evidence that officials of the PRI ruling government and the Mexican armed forces are directly involved in the planning, planting, harvesting, and selling of drugs.21 Students of Mexico and its military claim that for years senior officers are often allowed to enrich themselves with a variety of often illegal activities, including drug trafficking. This corruption assists in the military personnel remaining subservient to the politicians. Further, these students cite unstated agreements between the government and the military assures the military officers will not be prosecuted by civilian authorities for their illegal or extra-official activities.22 Drug related corruption within the military is just as tempting as it is to civilian officials, especially to relatively poorly paid officers and troops.23 A conversation with a journalist in the state of Oaxaca in May 1996 disclosed that the Mexican army historically has owned large plots of land on which the army has grown much of its food. The journalist claimed it was common knowledge among many Mexicans that the army grows and sells drugs, including marijuana, from these lands, or protects others who grow on army property. The army, it is claimed, has financed much of its military operations from the proceeds, and many officers reportedly have become rich from drug sales. This same journalist reported that a high ranking popular Mexican Army general is serving a lengthy prison sentence for having revealed the extent of Mexican military drug involvement.24 Numerous discussions with local residents in southern Mexico consistently revealed that the reported drug activity as claimed by the Mexican government corresponds closely with the arrival of large units of military after the January 1994 uprising, and especially after the army’s invasion of much of eastern Chiapas on February 9, 1995. The New York Times reported conclusive evidence was available linking the Mexican government and army to international narcotics trading which has been systematically covered up or deliberately ignored in order to protect the stability and good name of Mexico’s ruling PRI government.25 In November 1996 representatives of SIPAZ (Servicio Internacional para la Paz/International Service For Peace) were told by a pastoral worker with the Catholic church in the municipality of Ocosingo that he believed the introduction of drugs into the conflict area to be part of a low-intensity warfare strategy conducted by the Mexican Army. He reported having heard numerous accounts from campesinos in the remote areas with similar stories. Army personnel apparently stop campesino farmers and harass and intimidate them by accusing them of being Zapatistas, of being poor because they are lazy. As each campesino becomes more fearful, the army personnel tells him he needs to be productive and that the army can offer marijuana seeds that he can grow and sell for money. If the army succeeds in "convincing" him to grow the marijuana, the army returns later to purchase it.26 Though the Mexican General in charge of the Chiapas region has publicly declared that the Indigenous in the area are not suspected of drug trafficking, increasingly the alleged presence of marijuana becomes the pretext for an army raid of a community at which time houses are searched and ransacked, and the residents threatened.27 Another pastoral worker who has worked for long years in the region reported that he never heard of any reports of any drugs in the area before the army militarized the territory beginning February 9, 1995.28 Furthermore, in the Zapatista conflict zone of eastern Chiapas, the communities have strict rules against all drugs and alcohol. There are signs along the roads declaring prohibition of drugs and alcohol. Additionally, the Zapatistas conduct their own searches of all vehicles and passengers passing through their villages. Any alcohol is immediately poured out on the road. Drugs are confiscated and destroyed. CONCLUSION Whatever the arguments made to stem the narcotics trade, several realities must be understood: (1) the huge market for drug consumption is among the inhabitants residing within the U.S.; (2) the Indigenous insurgents in Mexico are explicitly not suspected of involvement with drug trafficking; (3) U.S. military and drug aid to Mexico is being significantly used against the poor (the so-called insurgents) in counterinsurgency operations, rather than in the war against drugs, in defiance of U.S. articulated intentions; and (4) the amount of money involved in the drug trade, escalated in price because of its black market value due to legal prohibition, makes systemic corruption inevitable. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Section II Endnotes 1 Carlos Tello Diaz, La Rebelion en las Cañadas (1995): "Por Ley, Respeto al EZLN y Combate al Narcotrafico," Cuarto Poder (Apr. 22, 1996); "U.S. Drug Teams Could Be Active In Chiapas," Mexico City Times (Apr. 26, 1996). 2 "Clinton Pushes Military Aid," The Progressive (Feb. 1997). 3 The Progressive (Feb. 1997). 4 The Progressive (Feb. 1997). 5 Los Angeles Times (Jan. 19, 1997); The New York Times (Feb. 26, 1997). 6 "Drug Ties Taint 2 Mexican Governors," The New York Times (Feb. 23, 1997); "U.S. Losing War With Drug Smugglers at Mexican Border," San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 24, 1997); "Secretary to Mexican Patriarch Discloses Links to Drug Barons," The New York Times (Feb. 26, 1997). 7 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill and Co., rev. ed., 1991), p. 392. 8 Mexico City Times (Apr. 26, 1996). 9 La Jornada (Dec. 27, 1996). 10 "DEA Sings But the Conductor is in The White House," Mexico City Times (May 4, 1996). 11 Editorial, The New York Times (Feb. 26, 1997). 12 "Where the Drug Lords Hold Court," The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition (May 6-12, 1996). 13 The Washington Post (May 6-12, 1996). 14 The New York Times (Feb. 23, 1997). 15 The New York Times (Feb. 23, 1997). 16 The New York Times (Feb. 23, 1997). 17 "2 Democrats Call Mexico No U.S. Ally in Drug War," The New York Times (Feb. 26, 1997). 18 "U.S. Losing War With Drug Smugglers at Mexican Border," San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 24, 1997). 19 San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 24, 1997). 20 San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 24, 1997). 21 Tom Barry, ed., Mexico: A Country Guide (Albuquerque, NM: The Inter Hemispheric Resource Center, 1992), p. 56. 22 Barry, p. 56. 23 La Jornada (Oct. 18, 1996). 24 Brian Willson conversation in Oaxaca City, May 2, 1996. 25 The New York Times (July 31, 1995). 26 Conversation with SIPAZ board member, Phil McManus, Santa Cruz, CA (Jan. 14, 1997). 27 McManus (Jan. 14, 1997). 28 McManus (Jan. 14, 1997). By S. Brian Willson, March 1997 Mexico Committee. Bill Motto VFW Post 5888, P.O. Box 664, Santa Cruz, CA 95061 (408) 429-8345 In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.